



Raja Kehri Singh and the forgotten front: Reassessing Bushahr's role in the Tibet-Ladakh conflict

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ABSTRACT

The current historical literature on the Tibet-Ladakh war is largely based on sources from the major participants in the conflict namely Tibet, Ladakh, and the Mughals. The contributions and role of Bushahr, which were more or less decisive in the conflict, have been conveniently overlooked by these powers for various reasons. The Tibetan allies of Bushahr credited their victory to the Mongol General Galdan and the great Fifth Dalai Lama, and made no mention of the Bushahri *wazir's* efforts to ensure the Mughal withdrawal when the Tibetans had been pushed back. This paper further highlights the inaccurate historical narrative incorporated in the District Gazetteer, which later evolved into the popular view of history. The treaty between Tibet and Bushahr, as found in the document discovered at Namgia by A. H. Francke, is also examined and detailed. In essence, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the Bushahri perspective, the role and achievements of Raja Kehri Singh in the Tibet-Ladakh war, and offers an explanation for the Mughal failure to destroy the Tibetan force. Ultimately, it establishes that Bushahr was not merely a passive recipient of changes in the western Trans-Himalayas, but rather an active agent shaping the course of events, playing a significant role in weakening the power of Ladakh.

Keywords: Ladakh-Tibet War, Kehri Singh, Bushahr-Tibet Treaty.

1. Introduction

Historically, the socio-cultural diversity of the Western Himalayas and the parallel Trans-Himalayan regions around Ladakh is portrayed by the fact that Central Asian Muslim hajis used to cross Ladakh on their way west to Mecca and Medina, whereas the Buddhists and Hindus pilgrims (Beszterda, 2015)¹ travelled east to the sacred Mount Kailash² and Manasarovar Lake (Rizvi, 1999, p. 10). In the course of the late medieval era, this contrast between the Cis and Trans Western Himalayan regions was patently highlighted during the Ladakh-Tibet conflict, which saw the participation of the Buddhist, Islamic and Hindu political powers.

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Firstly, the Buddhist powers that formed the edifice of the conflict were, theocratic Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama and aided by the Mongols, pitted against monarchical Ladakh.³ Tibet then was led by the Fifth Dalai Lama, who was also the head of the Gelug sect (yellow hat sect) of Tibetan Buddhism and was also considered the living Boddhisattva Avalokiteshwar (Handa, 2014, p. 205). In contrast to Gelug sect dominated Tibet, in Ladakh, the Dragma sect [i.e. red hat sect] was in prominence and received patronage for the lay monarch. Secondly, the Islamic belligerents in the conflict which aided Ladakh included the Mughal Empire, which, then, was ruled by the conservative Sunni monarch Aurangzeb and the Shia chief from Skardoo. Thirdly, as for the Hindu powers, participating in the war, they included the Western Himalayan principalities of Kullu and Rampur-Bushahr, led by Raja Bidhi Singh and Raja Kehri Singh, respectively, with the former being in the camp of the Mughals and the latter aided the Tibetans.

Even though, historically overlooked and little credited, Bushahr states under Raja Kehri Singh was *sin qua non* in destabilizing the short-lived dominance of Ladakh over modern day Western Tibet. In fact Bushahr played the decisive role in aiding and establishing a new and enduring *status quo* wherein, Tibet acted as the new hegemon. Further, Raja Kehri Singh not only successfully expanded his territory from Wangtu Bridge till Shipki La (Francke, 1914, p. 9) but also entered into a treaty with Tibet which laid the basis for a prosperous Trans-Himalayan trade wherein Rampur and Gartok⁴ served as the main trading centers.

2. Contested chronicles: divergent narratives of the conflict

The primary accounts for the reconstruction of an objective history of the Tibet-Ladakh conflict are quite limited. The accounts can be divided into four groups which are the Ladakhi, Tibetan, Mughal and Bushahri sources.

2.1 Ladakhi sources:- As for the Ladakhi narrative, the royal chronicles of Ladakh, i.e. *La dvags rgyal rabs*, only glance over the subject of conflict, most likely due to the fact that the war had embarrassed and denuded the royal prestige of Ladakh. However, *casus belli* for the conflict as per Ladakhi sources was the decision of the Namgyal monarch to side with his fellow Drugpa sect state of Bhutan in its conflict with Tibet (Jinpa, 2015, p. 113).

The first text of the modern era, which discussed the conflict, was ‘History of Western Tibet’ by A. H. Francke (Tobdan, 2008, p. 113)⁵ wherein, the relevant portion of the text contains merely paraphrasing of the Royal Chronicle of Ladakh. The work of Francke was devoid of reference to any other point of view and sources (Petech, 1947, p. 171). Nevertheless, the major contribution of the text was the fact that it introduced this war into the modern consciousness.

2.2 Tibetan sources:- Among the Tibetan sources, the most exhaustive overview of the conflict is provided by the autobiography of the fifth Dalai

Lama and by 1698 work, of his regent, Sanggye Gyatso (Jinpa, 2015, p. 113). The Tibetan sources, in an attempt to justify and legitimise their wanton aggression, portray the Namgyal monarch of Ladakh as, among others, arrogant, greedy, evil, and even “enraged anti-Buddhist” (Jinpa, 2015, p. 114). The Tibetan sources, in essence, press forth that the aggressive and anti-yellow hat, i.e. Gelugpa attitude of the Ladakhi monarch, fermented the conflict.

2.3 Mughal sources: - The Mughal sources only cover the conflict incidentally and are limited to the later portion of the war which saw the involvement of the Mughal forces. *Tarikh-i-Kashmir* notes that the request of aid by the Gyalpo [King] of Ladakh was accepted by Emperor Aurangzeb while he was at Aurangabad in Deccan. Further, *Tarikh-i-Kashmir* states that in 1094 A.H. [Hijri Calendar], apart from the great flood, the other noteworthy event was the invasion of Ladakh, recorded as Great Tibet, by the Tibetans who were referred as Qalmaqas, i.e. Mongols. The text further, states that the Mughal troops were called from as far as Kabul, and they were commanded by Fidai Khan, son of Ibrahim Khan, Subedar of Kashmir (Petech, 1947, p. 183).

2.4 Sources from Bushahr: - Unfortunately, during Goorkha’s occupation of Bushahr in early nineteenth century, the archives and records of the Bushahr were destroyed and historians have noted the “Gurkhas left behind nothing but rubble” (Mamgain, 1971, p. 60).

Author J. C. French also observed:

‘It is to be regretted that the archives and records of the State [Bushahr], as well as the raja’s family, were destroyed by the Gurkhas’⁶

Nevertheless, the utter lack of historical material of Bushahr state was significantly addressed by the discovery of document containing a treaty between Tibet and Bushahr found at Namgiya by the German Moravian missionary A. H. Francke in 1909 (Francke, 1914, p. 24). A. H. Francke as to the discovery of the treaty noted in his work ‘Antiquities of Indian Tibet’ the following:

“He (Hira, village chief of Namgia and descendent of a Tibetan Bonpo family) said he was in possession of a document of ancient times. After much persuasion he produced it, and it turned out to be a copy of the treaty between Raja Kehari Singh of Bashahr and the Lhasa government, headed by Galdan Thsang.’

Further, Francke notes that he during his expedition had found two versions of the treaty. (Francke, 1914, p. 7) It is likely that the same document was rediscovered by Italian tibetologist Prof. Tucci in 1933 at the trading post (Halkias, 2009, p. 68) of Namgiya in Kinnaur (Petech, 1977, p. 170). The document found by Prof. Tucci was identical to the copy of Francke, a fact which augments its value as valid evidence. This *sui generis* source provides unique insights into the conflict and highlights the decisive role of Bushahri forces. Further, the British Foreign Department correspondences during the

colonial period also emphasised that the custom of tax-free trade existed between the two regions; this fact is also supported by the oral histories of Kinnaur. Though, academic studies in this area have been severely limited and anemic, but the contributions of Prof. Petech and, more recently, Georgios T. Halkias are noteworthy.

3. An outline of the three states prior to the conflict

3.1 An overview of the Bushahr state and Raja Kehri Singh

Bushahr State was the largest state among the category of Simla Hill States recognised by the British after the Anglo-Gurkha War. Geographically the state was a part of the Sutlej catchment, and as determined by the British its area was 3,820 square kilometres (Weston, 1911, p. 4) and along with Bilaspur and Sirmaur, Bushahr was among the three paramount powers of Shimla Hill States (Mamgain, 1971, p. 57) but unlike Bilaspur and Sirmaur, Bushahr was placed right next to the Tibetan plateau. In essence geography mandated close relations between Bushahr and Trans-Himalayan catchment of Sutlej for e.g. the close socio-economic relationship between Ngari, Spiti, Upper Kinnaur and Bushahr was ensured by the fact that the antecedent river Sutlej provides a natural highway for traders, pilgrims, herders etc. to safely cross the Himalayas. Further, Rampur was the sole proximate town with a big market and access to goods and traders from the Indian plains. Rampur was also accessible from these regions even during the winters as no pass had to be crossed during the journey (Mamgain, 1971, p. 141).

The kings (Rajas) of Bushahr⁷ were considered to be semi-divine, and they were even worshipped by a significant section of their subjects and people from the Kinnaur region of the state believed that the Rajas of Bushahr, upon death, were reincarnated as the Dalai Lama (Weston, 1911, p. 6). There are different accounts as to the origin of the ruling family, and even the genealogy presented by historians like Francke and Tucci does not match (Petech, 1947, p. 176). The two genealogies of the royal family, one kept at Rampur and another at Kamru, are not consonant *inter se*, with the latter being longer than the former. Nevertheless, the popular belief was that the royal family of Bushahr descended from Praduman, the grandson of Lord Krishna (Buck, 1904, p. 247).

Historically it was Raja Chatar Singh, one hundred and tenth in line from Parduman (Weston, 1911, p. 5) who became the first ruler to exercise effective jurisdiction over the whole territory of Bushahr State including Kinnaur till Wangtu (Mamgain, 1971, p. 57) and even the neighbouring *Thakurs* were under his influence and necessary tribute was received (Weston, 1911, p. 7). Raja Kehri Singh, one hundred and thirteenth from Parduman (Weston, 1911, p. 6) was most likely the grandson of Raja Chatar Singh.

It is believed that Raja Kehri Singh was an *ajanuyaku* like Lord Ram and he once visited the *darbar* of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (Weston, 1911, p. 6). It

is stated that the emperor upon witnessing a supernatural phenomenon was pleased to grant upon the Raja the title of *Chattarpati* along with a *khillat*.⁸ The greatness of Kehri Singh may also be gauged by the fact that little information is available about the Rajas who followed him like Vijay Singh and Udai Singh (Mamgain, 1971, p. 59). When Raja Kehri Singh's reign started, Ladakh was the paramount power of the region and controlled the areas of Ngari, Upper Kinnaur and Spiti. It was evident that for Bushahr to augment its territory in these regions, the contours of Ladakhi authority had to be denuded.

3.2 Kingdom of Ladakh and expansion under Gyalpo Senggee Namgyal

To appreciate the context of the Tibet-Ladakh war it is vital to understand the background within which Ladakh established its hegemony over large parts of the Western Trans-Himalaya. The kingdom of Ladakh was ruled by the Namgyal dynasty which had witnessed its high-water mark after the expansion made by Gyalpo Senggee Namgyal (Stobdan, 2019, p. 20).⁹ Senggee had augmented the status of Ladakh as the dominant power across the traditional threefold dominion (Ahmad, 1968, p. 340)¹⁰ that included, *inter alia*, Ladakh, Guge, Puhurang, Zaskar, Spiti,¹¹ Lahaul and parts of Kinnaur. Sengge had, as a prince, captured Rudok in 1614 and Burang in 1615 (Stobdan, 2019, p. 21). Later, he conquered the capital, of Guge, Tsaparang, after surrender of Tashi Drakpa, and he placed his second son, Indrabodhi Namgyal, as the new monarch.

In 1638, Chokur, a descendant of Altan Khan, invaded Guge and Senggee Namgya not only defeated this Mongol force but also pursued it till Central Tibet, and most likely during this expedition, Sengge subdued the monastic fiefs and herding communities in Mustang and Droshod. (Jinpa, 2015, p. 125). Hence, the authority of Ladakh extended till Jumla, Dolpo and Mustang (Jinpa, 2015, p. 115) which lie beyond the Mayum La pass,¹² and today form part of Nepal. Sengge also controlled Spiti (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 485), and his subordinate Gaga Chering Namgyal held the Dhankar fort (Francke, 1907, pp. 92, 101), which, upon his death, was passed on to Dechog Namgyal, who was the youngest son of Sengge Namgyal (Rizvi, 1983, p. 52).

In gravamen, Ladakhi hegemony was created upon the whole of Ngari, including the vital trading and the pilgrimage route to Kailasa and Mansarovar and Senggee eventually fixed Mayum La as the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet (Peteck, 1977, p. 171). Therefore, at the very least, the entire Trans-Himalayan catchment of Indus and Sutlej, except Balistan, was under the control of the Namgyal dynasty. Hence, Bushahr was now bordered by Ladakhi domains not only in the North towards Upper Kinnaur and Spiti but also in the east and resultantly the utility and prosperity of the vital trade route along the Sutlej and the pilgrimage of Bushahr to Manasarovar and Kailash were under the discretion of Leh. This period of expansion and wealth for Ladakh is also highlighted by the fact that Leh Palace was built before the iconic Potala Palace in Lhasa, by decades (Jinpa, 2015, p. 137).

After successfully concluding a campaign against the Mongols Sengge passed away at Hanle in 1642 (Petech, 1977, pp. 47–48; Stobdan, 2019, p. 21). Most likely, he was not older than forty (Rizvi, 1983, p. 52), though, just like the fifth Dalai Lama, his demise was kept as a secret for a few years (Karmay, 2014, p. 202). Sengge was a patron of the red hat sect and was naturally, not liked by the Tibetans, and they called him *rdud-rgyal*, i.e. the evil king of Ladakh (Stobdan, 2019, p. 21). The Tibetan sources even represented the Ladakhi Gyalpo as anti-Buddhist. Subsequently, the Kingdom of Ladakh in an attempt to improve strained relations with Tibet sent two missions to Lhasa in 1664 and 1667 respectively, but both were devoid of any breakthrough and the Fifth Dalai Lama was quite upset with the missions (Ahmad, 1968, p. 344). Hence, the background ground for the conflict was laid by firstly, the significant conquests by Sengge Namgyal, secondly, by the desire of the yellow hat sect dominated Tibet to subdue the regions under influence of the red hat sect like Bhutan and Ladakh and lastly, there were economic and social factors discussed in the following section.

3.3 Consolidation of Tibet and rise of the yellow hat sect

After the fall of the Mongol, Yuan dynasty in China, it was the Mongol leader Gushri Khan who successfully militarily united the region, by conquering Eastern and Central Tibet.¹³ Though his armies were “known for their brutality towards soldiers and civilians alike” (Van Schaik, 2011, p. 147). Subsequently, Gushri Khan as the patron handed over the administration of Tibet to his priest i.e. the Fifth Dalai Lama. Hence, in practice, Tibet was governed by the Dalai Lama instead of lay governors. As for the sectarian divide the Italian missionary Jesuit Ippolito overview Desideri had noted the Gelugpas’ lingering “hate” and “persecution” of other sects of Tibetan Buddhism (Desideri, 1937, pp. 220–225). The religious convictions of the Gelugpa sect were made clear by the fact that if anyone failed to show respect for the Gelug teachings, the new ‘theocracy’ swore not to remain “without blood on [its] spears.” (Van Schaik, 2011, p. 149). For the Gelugpa sect, the Drukpa were nothing more than heretics and deceivers. After consolidating their power in Tibet the Gelugpa authorities at Lhasa were concerned with the fact that the frontier areas of the ethnographic Tibetan regions from Bhutan to Ladakh, like Mustang and Dolpo, were aligned with the Drukpa sect. In this regard Tibet had on at least seven occasions attacked Bhutan (Ardussi, 1999, pp. 65–66) and after the failure of these military expeditions, in 1679, a peace treaty was agreed between the two sides (Jinpa, 2015, p. 128). The Mongol troops, having learned the lesson, turned their attention towards the other major Drukpa power of Ladakh. The economic and social basis for the Tibetan invasion of Ladakh included among others, the control over lucrative shawl wool trade, the gold fields of Ngari and lastly, the prestige gained by the control over the holy sites around Mount Kailash. The production and export of *pashmina* shawls was vital for the economic well-being of the entire region from Ngari to Kashmir. Commercially, the most valuable activity for the region was

sheep rearing, the resultant wool manufacturing and trade (Petech, 1947, p. 172). As for the gold fields of Ngari the Mughal prince Mirza Haidar Dughlat,¹⁴ who had invaded Ladakh and ventured into Guge, concluded that:

“God has so created this soil that when the gold is taken from the ground, it does not diminish” (Dughlat, 1895, pp. 411–412).

Yet, by the time of the Tibetan invasion the gold fields had for long been in decline. In conclusion, the economic concerns though noteworthy were ancillary and incidental to the sectarian kernel of the conflict (Jinpa, 2015, p. 114).

4. Tibet-Ladakh war and the role of Bushahr

4.1 The chronology and the proceeding of the conflict

On July 7, 1679 the fifth Dalai Lama, ignoring the advice (Ahmad, 1968, p. 349) of his regent, ordered for a military expedition to Ladakh (Halkias, 2009, p. 63) under Galdan Boshugtu Khan (Tucci, 1947, p. 29).¹⁵ Galdan was not only a monk at the Tashilungpo monastery but also a Mongol prince (Halkias, 2009, p. 63) by descent as he was the grandson of the Mongol conqueror Gurshi Khan, who had aided the fifth Dalai Lama to gain temporal power. Further, Galdan was also the cousin of Dallas Khan (Petech, 1947, p. 174), who was the then protector King of Tibet. Additionally, it had been prophesied that the fifth Dalai Lama would one day subjugate Ladakh (Ahmad, 1999, pp. 236–239).

Galdan despite his martial lineage, before this military expedition, had only modicum of administrative experience that too, limited to maintaining order at the local market of Tashilungpo (Petech, 1947, p. 174). Further, Galdan, as per the Tibetan sources, was reluctant to take up the mantle for the expedition due to his pacifist faith, and only after significant hesitation, he accepted the duty bestowed by the Dalai Lama. Further, Galdan had also received encouraging omens from the Tibetan state oracle. The force for the conquest of Ladakh that departed from Lhasa, though, an elite contingent was merely two hundred and fifty troops strong (Petech, 1947, p. 175). The remaining Tibetan army was created from the Western regions based on the system of levies. The small initial force allowed for circumventing lengthy preparations or carrying huge logistics additionally the force also had the advantage of great mobility. Galdan proceeded *via* Mayum La to the border of Ladakh which was unguarded, and thereby he successfully reached Manasarovar without a fight. At the holy lake and Mountain, Galdan paid the traditional offering and performed a *paridashina* (Petech, 1947, p. 175).

Prof. Petech, noted that Ladakhi leadership had failed to gauge the gravity of the situation and, despite advice to the contrary, they went ahead with a pitched battle against the Tibetan-Mongol force (Petech, 1947, p. 177). The first battle was fought around the desert plains at the junction of the two sources of the Indus above Tashigang (Petech, 1947, p. 178), which resulted in a decisive Tibetan victory. Evidently, due to the superior quality of the Mongol stallions and their proficiency to perform complex cavalry maneuvers the Ladakhis were

routed. Ideally the Ladakhis should have restrained themselves to their citadels. The cautious views were overlooked by most likely due to the prospect of capturing the Tibetan booty and as a result of underestimating the strength of their adversary.

After the initial Tibetan victory further reinforcements were requested from Tibet due to the presence of Ladakhi garrisons in the region. These reinforcements numbered around five thousand soldiers (Petechn, 1947, p. 179) and resultantly the Ladakhi garrison at Ngari surrendered as they were deterred from putting up resistance due to the sight of the large Tibetan reinforcements. Further, the strategic forts of Tashigang and Tsaparang were also taken over by the Tibetans. Thereby, the Ladakhi troops gave up their strongholds in Ngari without a long fight (Petechn, 1947, p. 180) that would have tied down the Tibetans. Proceeding with the invasion, the Tibetan army in a surprise maneuver instead of following the course of Indus to enter Ladakh proper *via* Demchok instead moved to Ruthog and entered Ladakh along the Pangong Tso. The second battle of the war, in which the Ladakhi King personally participated, was fought below the Changla pass (Petechn, 1947, p. 180). Yet again, the Tibetans defeated the Ladakhi army (Rizvi, 1983, p. 54), and the humiliated Gyalpo resultantly retreated to the Tingmosgang monastery. Subsequent to this victory, additional forces joined the Tibetans which likely included the natives from Guge or the Bushahri troops (Petechn, 1947, p. 181). Later, Leh, the nerve centre of Ladakh fell without resistance and to symbolically signify that Ladakh had been humbled, the Tibetan General's horse was tied to the lion gate of the Leh palace. The seemingly comprehensive conquest of Ladakh by the Tibetans was followed by the long siege of Basgo (Ahmad, 1968, p. 350). The fortifications at Basgo were nearly impregnable, and Basgo was believed to have perianal water supply (Rizvi, 1983, p. 54). During the siege, the Tibetan and the Bushahri troops were present at Goro or Daru (Petechn, 1947, p. 182).

The long length of the siege provided the Gyalpo of Ladakh with the necessary time to employ diplomacy whereby he successfully negotiated to receive the essential succor from the Mughal Subhedar of Kashmir Ibrahim Khan. As per some authors, historically the Mughals had enjoyed suzerainty over Ladakh (Petechn, 1947, p. 183). The Mughal policy as to the Western Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan chiefs was to force them into the status of tributaries and never of outright conquest.¹⁶ The Mughals were interested in the developments in Ladakh due to, among others, the potential effect of Tibetan conquest on the lucrative wool trade. At the bare minimum the Mughals wanted to ensure that the trade route was not disturbed for long.

The Mughal forces entered Ladakhi territory through the famous Zoji La, and they were aided in their expedition by the ruler of Skardoo (Petechn, 1947, p. 184) and Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu,¹⁷ who, nonetheless, during the conflict, plundered Zaskar which was a principality of Ladakh. The Mughal participation immediately altered the *status quo*, the siege of Basgo was lifted,

and a battle was fought near Bagso, at the plains of Chargyal, near Nimoo village, wherein the Tibetans-Mongol forces were decisively defeated. After their defeat, the Tibetan army retreated to Pangong Tso (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 486). The sequence of events is also corroborated by independent Mughal sources like *Tarik-e-Kashmir* and *Maasir-i-Alangiri* that state Mughal forces intervened in 1094 A.H., during Aurangzeb's reign.

Nevertheless, the Mughals failed to exploit their clear military advantage to either entirely destroy the Tibetans force or conquer the recently lost Ngari. At the most decisive moment of the entire campaign Mughals returned to Kashmir and thereby ended any chance for Ladakh to reclaim its recently lost territories. Though, Ladakh proper was entirely freed from the invaders and recovered with the aid of Mughals. The Mughal sources claimed decisive victory and are entirely silent on the reasons for Mughal withdrawal, which seems quite improper and imprudent. On the other hand Tibetan sources, eulogising the Dalai Lama, pressed that in light of the magic and the special powers of the Dalai Lama, the Mughal soldiers panicked and left the campaign¹⁸ this explanation *prima facie* does not seem rational. Hence, a rational observer may venture to state that the Mughals, having succeeded in their primary objective i.e. to ensure independence and territorial integrity of Ladakh proper were satisfied and also being unaccustomed to the Trans-Himalayan winters, wanted to reach Kashmir before the snowfall could have blocked the notorious Zoji La and therefore, decided against proceeding to Ngari.¹⁹

The lack of documentary evidence that explained this juncture of the conflict was addressed by the finding of A. H. Francke and Prof. Tucci. The document exchanged between the Tibetan and Bushahri leadership highlights that the Mughals were bribed to withdraw by the Bushahri minister. Even though this premise for the Mughal withdrawal is based on a single document, the same was accepted by Prof. Petech as the factual position. This event may even be stated to be the most decisive aspect of the whole campaign, which had repercussions on the politics of the entire region for centuries to come.

Eventually, the war was concluded by the Treaty of Tingmosgang wherein, the Tibetans got significant territorial, religious and economic concessions from the Gyalpo of Ladakh. The entire duration of the Tibetan expedition is said to have been between the years 1679 and 1684, though Prof. Petech has provided an alternative and shorter timeline (Petech, 1947, p. 188). Lastly, the Tibetans, despite their victory, were alarmed by the request and resultant succor provided by the Islamic powers like Mughals to the Gyalpo of Ladakh. Tibetans must have been aware of the fact that the Gyalpo was even asked to convert to Islam in exchange for the Mughal aid. The Tibetans, therefore, emphasised in their agreement with Ladakh that the religious beliefs and practices of Buddhists and non-Buddhists were hostile to each other and the Gyalpo of Ladakh should not call upon foreign armies (Ahmad, 1999, p. 352). Yet, the responsibility of defending the boundary between Buddhist and non-Buddhist countries was solely entrusted to the monarch of Ladakh (Ahmad, 1999, p. 352).

4.2 Understanding the Tibet-Bushahr alliance against Ladakh

Most likely in 1679-1680, the Raja of Bushahr, Kehri Singh crossed the Shipki La, which later became the customary border between Tibet and Bushahr, to meet the Tibetan general. The monarch most likely proceeded *via* Tholing along the Sulej valley to reach the region of Mount Kailash where he also made offerings at the holy Manasarovar Lake. The meeting between the two chiefs was likely made on the plains of Puling/Pulling Thang at Zhang-zhung, Guge¹⁹ as provided in the document of Namgiya (Petech, 1947, p. 176).

Prof. Petech has noted that Galdan:

“Upon his arrival in the Kailash Manasarovar region obtained, by a personal interview, the armed help of Raja Kehri Singh, in exchange for trade facilities” (Petech, 1977, p. 72).

The Bashahrhri Raja, apart from the unimpeded trade through the territories of Ngari, was also offered privilege of the biennial official delegation (Petech, 1977, p. 176). It seems that the forces from Bushahr joined their Tibetan-Mongol counterparts only the year after the meeting between the two leaders. It is likely that the Tibetan general only after winning the first battle of the war and having proved his worth met the Raja of Bushahr. During their meeting Raja Kehri Singh and Tibetan General Galdan negotiated and agreed to a treaty that was prepared in the name of ‘Buddha Shakyamanui’ to abide by the provisions therein, till perpetuity. The Treaty contained a small preamble/preface which highlighted the sanctity of the treaty, followed by four articles. Even though the treaty was concluded either in 1679 or 1680, it could have only taken effect in or after 1684. As it was only possible after the conflict, when Tibet acquired sovereignty and control over the region of Ngari, that the Tibetan authorities were in a position to fulfill their end of the obligation contained in the treaty, which included the assurance of safe trade and travel in Ngari as well as other services for the biennial delegation from Bushahr.

4.3 An analysis of the Tibet-Bushahr treaty of 1679

The document (Halkias, 2009, p. 82) found at Namgiya noted that during the reign of Raja Jodagpo (Halkias, 2009, p. 82) Guge had been conquered by the Gyalpo of Ladakh. Nevertheless, Galdan had received some prophesies (or revelation)(Halkias, 2009, p. 82) which assured him of his victory if he were to march on Ngari and Mayul (old name of Ladakh). The documents further noted that Raja Kehri Singh had called upon in aid the forces of 25 Rajas and 18 Thakurs or 21 Rajas and 18 Thakurai as per other translations but none of them responded undeterred, Raja Kehri Singh decided to proceed forth. The translation provided by Georgios T. Halkias notes that Raja Kehri Singh started his expedition on the pretext of taking a bath at Mansarovar (Halkias, 2009, p. 82). The document further provided that the Raja and Galdan had a meeting at Zhang-zhung in Guge.

The two leaders were respectively referred to, as the king of upper and lower (Halkias, 2009, p. 70), which most likely meant Tibet and Bushahr. The document furthermore acknowledged the joining of the two forces, i.e. of Tibet and Bushahr, against the Gyalpo of Ladakh. During the war it was *wazir* Chodas of Bushahr (Halkias, 2009, p. 83) who commanded the Bushahri army.

The document also acknowledged that Ladakh had called upon the Kashmiris and Baltis in aid, who were referred as Pathans. (Halkias, 2009, p. 71). It is also noteworthy that the preface of the treaty mentioned that the minister of Bushahr and the Tibetan officer named Don-agrub²⁰ gave either fifteen loads of gold and silver or five bags (Halkias, 2009, p. 83) to the Kashmiris and Balti, i.e. the Mughals and their allies. In addition, the Mughals were also provided with the necessary provisions for their return (Halkias, 2009, p. 72) journey and thereby deserted by allies the Gyalpo of Ladakh was subjugated by Tibet and Bushahr.

Even though, the Tibet–Bushahr treaty of 1679 is not systematically divided into articles, as it followed a passage-like format; nevertheless, the following articles can be extracted.

The treaty opened with a preamble that delineated various symbols and events highlighting the sacrosanct nature of the treaty. After the preamble, the two sides solemnly agreed to respect each other's boundary, i.e. territorial integrity.

Article one provided – The leaders of Tibet and Bushahr, committed to the terms of the treaty, should dispatch messengers and envoys.

Article two provided – Once every three years, Bushahr is required to send messengers to dwell in the four forts of Ngari, namely, Tsaprrang, Purang, Rutog and Gartok.

Article three provided - That the subjects of the Tibetan and the Bushahri king, whenever visiting any part of each other's territory, should not be subjected to the slightest measure of taxation, or anything of the sort.

Article four provided – That the Tibetan and Bushahri king should not deviate from this agreement by ever using murderous weapons or poison cups.

The last article, in essence, meant that the two sides must continue their relations with good faith and their dealing should be bereft of any treachery.

In brief, the treaty provided in the first two articles for the maintenance of active diplomatic relations, and the engagement of envoys of Bushahr at, among others, Tsaparang and Rutog. Article three dealt with tax-free trade, and the last article reflected assurance of maintaining honesty in future transitions (Halkias, 2009, p. 66). It is interesting to note that Article Three fails to expand on the nature of trade, and there is no mention of wool or gold. Further, the incorporation of article three suggests that during the control of the Ngari by Ladakh, trade was either prohibited or discouraged through heavy taxation. Such

economic policies, if followed, would have been beneficial for Ladakh as the Gyalpos of Ladakh would have prospered economically by the valuable trade of wool and gold flowing solely towards Ladakh proper. The Namgiya document ends by acknowledging that for thirteen generations Rajas of Bushahr have not violated the treaty. (Halkias, 2009, p. 83).

After the conclusion of the conflict, both the Ladakhi and Bushahri representatives agreed that Ngari was under the administration of Tibet (Halkias, 2009, p. 72). Further, Bushahr also gained the territories of Upper Kinnaur at the expense of Ladakh, though the same was not expressly provided in the treaty between Bushahr and Tibet, but this territorial shift from Ladakh to Bushahr must have happened after this conflict²¹ (Petech, 1947, p. 192). This new frontier between Bashahr with Tibet was so well known that there is a common saying in Tibet which states that *Pimala Yanchhod Bod Gialbo, Pimala Ranchhod KhunaGialbo*—that translates to,

“The territory above Pimala [Shipki Pass] belongs to the Raja of Tibet and below to the Raja of Bashahr.” (Ministry of External Affairs, 1961, P. 168).

Resultantly, this war determined the modern boundary of India and Tibet, though no demarcation was undertaken. The only significant cross-border movement by military forces after this conflict was, firstly, the Dogra invasion led by Zorawar Singh in 1841, and later the Chinese invasion of India in 1962.

The oral traditions in Kinnaur to date acknowledge that the famous Lavi fair,²² held annually at Rampur,²³ is based on the Tibet-Bushahr treaty (Halkias, 2009, p. 73). In essence, the treaty was the edifice of remunerative and prosperous Trans-Himalayan trade²⁴ and resultantly Rampur developed as a viable trade center of the region (Moran, 2007, p. 173).

4.4 The decisive role of the Bushahri army

The alliance with Bushahr must have provided the Tibetans not only with additional and fresh manpower and resources but also vital intelligence and knowledge of the local terrain. As aforementioned, the army from Rampur, which invaded Ladakh along with the Tibetan Army (Mamgain, 1971, p. 58), was commanded by the *Wazir* Chhodas. The army, likely, joined the Tibetan army at Go-ro in Ladakh before the second battle of the war at Chang La/Byan La. The delay in the joining of the two forces was because the meeting and agreement between Raja Kehri Singh and the Tibetan General happened sufficiently late in the year that no time was left for the Bushahri troops to assemble and reach Ngari (Petech, 1947, p. 176) before the passes were closed by snow or were dangerous to cross.

The sources highlight that forces of Bushahr were present at the siege of Bagso and most likely participated in the subsequent conflict against the Mughals. Nevertheless, the critical role played by the Bushahri *wazir* during the campaign was not on the battlefield but it was instead his ability to successfully convince

the Pathans, to withdraw from Ladakh after the battle of Bagso. In effect by the bribe *Wazir* Chhodas had bought over the Pathans, and it was essentially due to the desertion of the Pathans that Ladakh was eventually defeated (Mamgain, 1971, p. 58). The bribery of the Mughals very well explains their subsequent conduct and failure to advance and destroy the Tibetan army or force them into a long retreat. Even as per Prof. Petech, the Mughals led by Fidai Khan failed to press forth, their momentum, because of the lucrative bribe offered by the Bushahri *Wazir* (Petech, 1947, p. 186) and a Tibetan officer by the name of Don Grub/Nawang Donbub (Halkias, 2009, p. 83). Quite unsurprisingly, the Mughal sources are silent on the aspect of bribery, though the capture of booty was mentioned by them.

4.5 Potential causes for the failure of the Himalayan chiefs to aid Bushahr

To understand the failure of the local chiefs to aid Raja Kehri Singh, one needs to analyse the political situation of that era. Immediately preceding the Ladakh-Tibet war the local expansionist endeavours of Kehri Singh had resulted in Bushahr occupying certain regions of the Sulej valley belonging to the Kullu state. Raja of Kullu, therefore, appealed to Raja Bhim Chand of Bilaspur,²⁵ who, aided by Raja Sidh Sen of Mandi, moved with a huge army towards Rampur (Tobdan, 2008, p. 111). Raja Bhim Chand conquered the village of Duttanagar along the Sulej and thereafter, proceeded to Nirmand (Ganesh, 1882, pp. 61–62). Resultantly, the territories conquered by Rampur were restored to Kullu, as per account by Kavi Ganesh (Tobdan, 2008, p. 111). Further, in the same period the kingdom of Bilaspur had emerged as the overlord of the *Bharah Thakurains* (Chandel, 2007, p. 58)²⁶ of the Shimla region and hence it is not tough to understand why support was not forthcoming.

Further, due to the lack of unified command and in the absence of any prospects for territorial gains for other states, any expedition into the harsh Trans-Himalayan regions would have been quite low on the list of priorities for the Himalayan chiefs. Meanwhile, Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu, who was one of the Rajas to be called upon, by Bushahr had sided with the Mughals and for his services he was granted control over Lahaul (Handa, 2001, p. 206). In gravamen, the states did not functioned as a unified group; rather, more often than not, their interests were mutually conflicting, thereby, instead of undertaking a tough expedition against Ladakh, they were more focused on pulling their neighbours down.

5. Aftermath of the Tibet-Ladakh war

Galdan, after his victory, was received and greeted at Tashilungpo by the Tashi Lama. The Tibetan/Mongol army received a hero's welcome. The clear loser of the conflict was the Kingdom of Ladakh, which ended up paying to all the participants of the conflict. Further, the Mughal suzerainty over Ladakh was reaffirmed. The Gyalpo in return for Mughal aid had to convert to Islam and he took the name Aqabat Mahmud Khan (Halkias, 2009, p. 66). Additionally, the King even had to leave his son at the Mughal court to be brought up as a Muslim

(Halkias, 2009, p. 66). However, the Gyalpo quickly reverted to Buddhism, and his apostasy was conveniently overlooked by Delhi. Naturally, the Chronicles of Ladakh are silent on the issue of conversion (Rizvi, 1998, p. 55).

Territorially, Ladakh had to concede its authority not only to its adversaries but also to its allies! The Mughals took over the village of Nabsat from Ladakh. The Mughal ally Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu was granted Upper Lahaul for his aid. During the conflict Raja Bidhi Singh had invaded Lahaul and expelled Ladakhi influence from the valley (Diack, 1897, p. 37). Further, some parts of Baltistan, which had been taken over by Ladakh, were granted back to the chief of Skardoo.

As for the adversaries in 1684 the Treaty of Tingmosgang was signed between Tibet and Ladakh wherein *inter alia* the frontier between the two powers was decided, though not delineated. Ladakh lost the entire region between Mayum La and Demchok, though it retained the small enclave at Mensar i.e. Guge, which was re-conquered by Sengge Namgyal was lost forever (Rizvi, 1998, p. 55). Further, the Gyalpo of Ladakh had to send triennial presents to Lhasa (Shakabpa, 1967, p. 123), though tribute was also paid to the governors of Kashmir (India, Quarter Master General's Department, Intelligence Branch, 1974, p. 536).

It seems a modicum of ceremonial respect was retained by Lhasa over Ladakh as tribute/presents were paid/sent to the authorities at Gartok till 1842 (Peteche, 1947, p. 191) when Dogra conquered Ladakh.²⁷ As for the military situation the Tibetans consolidated themselves in Ngari and in 1715, the Italian Jesuit missionary Desideri found the region of Guge was “garrisoned by a strong body of Tartar [i.e. Mongol] and Tibetan troops” headed by “a Tartar Prince” (Desideri, 1937, p. 82). Further, Tibetans also made necessary administrative changes in the region and Tibetan governors i.e. *garpon* along with administrators, were sent to Guge, Puhurang and Spiti (Ahmad, 1968, pp. 348–349). As for the theological changes, the first Tibetan abbot of Tholing monastery reached Tholing two years after the Tibetan victory (Vitali, 1999, p. 49). The sectarian changes introduced after the conflict are still visible in modern-day Himachal as the stark contrast between Drukpa-aligned Lahaul and Gelugpa-dominated Spiti across Kunzum La highlights the religious implications of this political conflict.

6. An analysis of popular historical narrative

As per popular historical narrative Raja Kehri Singh defeated the Tibetan Commander Galden in a battle and a treaty was signed wherein it was provided that “Kailash will remain the boundary line between Kinnaur and Tibet”. Further, this view that Kailash was declared as the boundary between Bushahr and Tibet is also incorporated in the Himachal Pradesh District Gazetteers for Kinnaur (Mamgain, 1971, p. 59). This account does not seem reasonable for a plethora of reasons which include firstly, the non-alignment of their narrative

with the primary historical sources which include Tibetan, Ladakhi, Mughal sources and the treaty found by Francke and Prof. Tucci, secondly, it seems unlikely that, even in case of the Bushahri victory over Tibet in a hypothetical battle, the boundary would have been pushed till Kailash as the same was clearly beyond the material and manpower capacity of the Bushahri state and thirdly, this view fails to explain what the Ladakhi were doing during this conflict as Guge and Kailash were under their control since the expansion done by Senggee Namgyal.

The second anomaly regarding the conflict is found in the works of Vogel and Hutchison wherein, it is provided that the conditions created by the invasion of Ladakh by the forces from Eastern Tibet in AD 1646-47 (Wessels, 1924, pp. 75–76),²⁸ aided Kullu Raja to expand into Lahaul at the expense of Ladakh (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 110). The date accorded to this conquest is off by a few decades, as it was only in 1679 that the invasion of Ladakh happened. Thirdly, another view as to the alliance between Bushahr and Tibet was provided by S. R. Johri (Johri, 1964, pp. 24–26), who noted that Mughal Mirza Haider had invaded Ladakh in 1523 and Tibet to maintain peace along the Indo-Tibet frontier concluded a treaty of friendship with the monarch of Rampur. This view must also be overlooked after the scrutiny of the contemporary historical evidence as it is well established that Mirza Haider was the cousin of Emperor Babur whereas the Tibet-Ladakh war occurred during the reign of Aurangzeb.

Lastly, the popular narrative, which states that no Indian army had marched across western Tibet, i.e. Ngari before the Sikh-Dogra forces of Maharaja Sher Singh and Raja Gulab Singh under *Wazir* Zorawar Singh²⁹ invaded Tibet, seems to be an overstatement as the forces of Bushahr had achieved the feat over a century and half prior i.e. undertaking a Trans-Himalayan expedition in modern day western Tibet. Bushahris unlike Zorawar Singh who fought with the Tibetans and Qing forces with an army composed of, among others, the prince of Ladakh, Kehri Singh's forces fought against Ladakh in aid of Tibet.

7. Revised history of Bushahr state after Kehri Singh

The advantages for Bushahr of the Tibetan victory included *inter alia*, a prosperous Trans-Himalayan trade and dominance over Upper Kinnaur due to the withdrawal of Ladakh, it is purported that Raja Kehri Singh received Hangrang valley, situated along Spiti River, as a *jagir*. Further, the relations with Tibet also stood on a positive ground, thereby relieving the Bushahri army from the pressure to defend the Northern and Eastern frontiers of the state. In addition, as per Mr. Gerard in 1776 A.D., the fort of Dankhar was held by Bushahri forces for two years (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 487). As for Tibet, the tax-free trade between the two sides continued till the 1962 war.

In 1909 when A. H. Francke visited Rampur, Raja Shamsheer Singh of Bushahr showed him a fresco which was purported to be a copy of the painting at the palace of Lhasa. Francke noted in this reference that:

“The fresco evidently represents the treaty between Tibet and Bashahr concluded about 1650 A.D., when Bashahr was supported by the Mughal Emperor..... The Tibetans who had been beaten by the Mughal army at Basgo, near Leh, had to cede a portion of Guge, viz, the Satluj valley down to the Wangtu bridge, to Bashahr State.

It is quite clear that the fresco at the palace of the Bushahri Raja was based on the wrong view of history wherein, the characters and events described as part of the war did occur but the narrative was thoroughly distorted. This mistake can only be explained by the destruction of the royal record of the state during the Gurkha conquest where after most likely history had to be reconstructed based on memory. Further, close relation between Kehri Singh and the Mughals especially in the context of the grant of title of *chattarpati* might have induced the narrative that Bushahr had supported Mughals against the Tibetans. The narrative provided in the District Gazetteer and part of the popular history most certainly was borrowed from this paradigm.

Conclusion

The Tibet-Ladakh war spelled doom for the short-lived Trans-Himalayan Namgyal Empire (Petch, 1947, p. 169), as Ladakh, *inter alia*, lost the entire region of Ngari—including Ruthok, Guge, and Puhurang—to Tibet (Francke, 1907, p. 124); Upper Lahaul to Kullu; the village of Nabsat to Kashmir; Upper Kinnaur up to Shipki La to Bushahr; and its earlier territorial gains in Baltistan to the ruler of Skardoo (Halkias, 2009, p. 66). The western frontier of Ladakh was pushed back from Mayum La to Demchok. In essence, Ladakh lost half of its territory (Stobdan, 2019, p. 26). Moreover, the border established by the Treaty of Tingmosgang in 1684 largely came to define the modern boundary between India and Tibet.

During the conflict, the Mughals had acted in defence of their political and economic interest. In contrast, the Tibetans had acted offensively and they were primarily directed by their sectarian theological endeavours, though other socioeconomic considerations might have played an ancillary role. As for Ladakh, one has to agree with the analysis by Prof. Petch, wherein he states that Ladakh had attempted to make an Empire without a sufficiently large population base to sustain it, and hence they ended up creating too many enemies and subsequently Ladakh largely avoided an offensive action till its eventual conquest by the Dogras in 1842. As for Bushahr, we see that this small Himalayan principality played a decisive role in the war efforts of Tibet. As the Bushahri had a long history of interaction with the Mughals hence this would have naturally facilitated the monetary understanding i.e. bribe, which was agreed upon between the Tibetans and the Mughal belligerents. Evidently without the clever maneuvering by the *wazir* of Bushahr, the Tibetan campaign would not have reached a successful end. The treaty between Raja Kehri Singh and the Tibetan General Galdan established, among others, diplomatic relations

between the two powers and it opened tax-free trade which aided free travel of traders to the trade fairs at Gartok and Rampur which in the fullness of time established Rampur as a prosperous trading and commercial center of the region, with Suttlej acting as a natural highway for the traders. The free trade continued largely uninterrupted till the 1962 war and recently, limited border trade via Shipki La was restarted by India and China.

Further, Bushahr was successfully able to remove the influence of Ladakh from Upper Kinnaur, and though not explicitly provided it is safe to assume that Hangrang valley was granted to Bushahr by Tibet after their victory over Ladakh. Furthermore, the narrative that Kailash was determined as the boundary between Bushahr and Tibet after a war *inter se* seems to evidently fail upon the scrutiny of evidence and the idea that no Indian army had marched across western Tibet, i.e. Ngari before the Dogra forces of Wazir Zorawar Singh seems to be an overstatement. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that even though it is believed that the Raja Kehri Singh was granted the title of *Chattarpati* by Aurangzeb, he was more than willing to fight against the Mughals. This reflects that the imperial control over the Himalayan principalities was not especially strong especially during the Deccan expeditions of Aurangzeb. Lastly, as for Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu, his role in the conflict reflects that the Himalayan states acted as per their own interests, which often left them on opposing sides of the larger conflict. Nevertheless, it is quite evident that even though overlooked Bushahr state had a significant role in the history and politics of both the Himalayas and the Trans-Himalayas. The decisive contribution of Bushahri forces during the conflict was overlooked by the great powers and it was not incorporated in the larger historical narrative.

Notes

1. Hindu Gosains, who are a community of ascetics, also acted as trading pilgrims, and there were Bhotiyas from Gharwal and Kumaon. Further, written trade contact between the traders of the region was called *Gangya*.
2. Mount Kailash is considered holy not only by the various sects of Tibetan Buddhism but also by the Hindus, Jains and in the traditional Bon religion of Tibet.
3. 'La' 'dak' in the Tibetan language means the "land of high passes".
4. Much later, the British, as per the 1904 Anglo-Tibet Convention, which was the result of the expedition by Yonghusabnd during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, had established a trading agency at Gartok in Ngari.
5. He was a German Tibetologist, Marovian Missionary (Protestant) who discovered a consequential document at Namgia on 6 July 1909. The document was to be initially developed by the village chief of Namgia, by the name of Hipra, who claimed descent from a family of Tibetan ministers. Due to a dispute Francke had to send Lobsang his former pupil at Poo to go to Tibet and from the district officer of Tsra-brang he got the copy of the treaty. See Proceedings of the 13th Colloquium of the International Association for Ladakh Studies, edited by John Bray E Elena De Rossi Filibek, Until the feathers of the winged Black Raven turn White. Though, as per the account given by author Tobdan, Frankle got in possession of the concerned document from Zongpom (Officer of the Fort) of Tsaparang in Guge in 1909.

6. There is also a possibility the original document between the Bushahuri and the Tibetans must have been engraved on a copper plate, as was the local practice, which might have been destroyed during Goorkha expedition.
7. Later, one of the successors of Raja Kehri Singh, Raja Ram Singh who was the son of Raja Udai Singh selected Rampur his capital.
8. Khillat is the robes of honor and it was granted in ceremonies as early as the reign of Emperor Akbar. It was a mark of honor and respect that was only given to most illustrious individuals. The word “khillat” originally meant “something passed on,” especially a “garment cast off”.
9. He is also called the Lion King. He was the son of Jamyang Namgyal and Gyal Khatun, who was the daughter of the great King Raja Ali Sher Khan Anchan of Balitstan. It is interesting to note that his aunt, daughter of Ali Mir, was married to Mughal Emperor Jahangir.
10. About the year 950, Ngari Korsum was divided between three royal heirs of Kyide Nyima Gon. The eldest one of them revived Ladakh/Mayul, the middle one was given Guge, Puhurang and the youngest received Zaskar, Spiti. The family descended from the famous Yarlung dynasty of Tibet.
11. It is believed that Sengge namgyal also renovated the Tabo monastery at Spiti which was initially constructed by the monk from Guge the Great Translator Rinchen Zangpo. The great strategist Sengge Namgyal in his youth became a Drukpa monk. He came back to rule in 1624, and he selected Taksang Repa, from the Drukpa sect, as his spiritual mentor.
12. The pass is situated at the watershed of Sutlej and Brahmaputra River. Even in the ancient time a distinct culture flourished in this region of Sutlej and Indus rivers called Zhangzhung. Later, the Dogra general Zorawar Singh also attempted to push the boundaries of Sikh Empire till Mayum La.
13. The local ruler of Central Tibet, Tsang Desi, was executed in 1642 by Gurshi Khan. Tsang Desi was the last Tibetan Royal to rule in his own name.
14. Mirza Haider, was also the cousin of Emperor Babur and he during his Kashmir campaigns had even invaded Ladakh in 1532. He had also taken note of the importance of shawl trade.
15. His tomb is believed to be at Taklakot in Ngari where he had constructed a temple.
16. An exception to this Mughal inhibition was the Badakhshan campaign of Emperor Shahjhan which resulted in a complete failure. The Pathania Rajput Raja Jagat Singh of Nurpur had also served the Mughals in this conflict.
17. He was the son of Raja Jagat Singh
18. Even in case of the repeated failure of Mongols in Bhutan it was believed the reversals were due to Drukpa's spiritual power, magic and sorcery which were perceived as the agent behind the repeated failures endured by Lhasa. See Why Did Tibet and Ladakh Clash in the 17th Century?
19. This area is close to Puling south west of Tsaparang along the old trade route with joined Chamoli with Tholing.
20. It is interesting to note that as per interpretation by Rahul Sanskrityan, there were not two officials involved and the purported Tibetan official Nawang Donbud was in fact the *Wazir* from Buashahr.
21. It seems that the boundary was not only a well-known political frontier but it also represented a zone of social transition. As the German missionary and explorer A. H. Francke was told by Schnabel that when people from Bashahr, crossed the

boundary at Shipki La they used to dismissed caste and eat and drink with the Europeans.

22. The expression Lavi comes from “loe” which means a sheet of woollen cloth. Lavi festival is the last fair before on set of winters.
23. Finest *Pashm* was brought to Rampur during Fair. Further, a well-developed trade existed between Kinnaur and Tibet which even had a functioning dispute settlement body.
24. Historically, Gartok has been known for its trading fair. The Gartok to Rampur wool trade route had also developed in spite of the fact that as per the treaty of Tingmosgang the main route for the lucrative wool trade was along Ladakh to Kashmir (Gerard, 1841, p. 116) yet alternate routes across Lahaul, Kullu and Garhwal also developed. Wherein, the Bhotiya dominated the Trans-Himalayan trade in the Garhwal region.
25. He was also the grandson of Raja of Kullu by relation.
26. Raja of Bilaspur was paid tribute till the beginning of British rule in 1815 by, Baghal, Kunhiar, Beja, Dharni, Keonthal, Kothar, Jubbal, Baghat, Bajji, Mailog, Mangal and Balsan, which amounted to 7,800 Rs.
27. Bushahr also used to send trifling presents to Garoo every three years for the Dalai Lama of Lhasa. See Account of Koonawur in the Himalaya by Capt. Alexander Gerard.
28. The two kingdoms had a skirmish shortly before 1620, when the ruler of Guge had abruptly cancelled a marriage with the sister of the king of Ladakh. The king of Ladakh later declared war on Guge.
29. *Wazir Zorawar Singh*, a native of Bilapur in modern day Himachal, also had paid obeisance at Manasarovar in his expedition of 1841, Raja Kehri Singh of Bushahr too paid obeisance at Manasarovar in 1679.

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